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Abstract: The paper illustrates the possibility of relating the fundamental 
laws of logical thinking with the basic principles to thermodynamics. According 
to this hypothesis, the idea of a “transcendental realm” that hosts the a priori 
categories of understanding is no longer needed, because human logic can be 
regarded as the result of a process of fine-tuning in our mind’s ability to percei-
ve of patterns of identity and change in nature.
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Resumen: El artículo ilustra la posibilidad de establecer una relación entre 
las leyes fundamentales del pensamiento lógico y los principios básicos de la 
termodinámica. Según esta hipótesis, la idea de un “ámbito trascendental” que 
albergue las categorías a priori del entendimiento resulta innecesaria, porque 
la lógica humana puede comprenderse como el fruto de un proceso de refina-
miento paulatino en la capacidad de la mente para percibir patrones de identi-
dad y cambio en la naturaleza. 
Palabras clave: Categorías a priori, termodinámica, lógica, identidad, 
diferencia.
One of Immanuel Kant’s most conspicuous claims points to the exis-
tence of a priori concepts in the human mind. A deep philosophical question is 
involved in his attempt at integrating rationalism and empiricism by showing 
that our understanding is endowed with a series of categories that have been 
mysteriously transmitted from one generation to another: is it possible to pro-
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ve that there are a priori categories inside the human spirit? In case it is, 
what is their scope and what are their limits? 
The importance of Kant’s transcendental deduction has been out-
lined by several authors.2 In fact, over the last decades there has been 
a renewed interest in Kant’s transcendental argument.3 In light of con-
temporary literature, it is clear that studying this dimension of Kant’s 
epistemology is essential for grasping the nature of his entire philosophi-
cal project.4 However, even the advocators of Kant’s approach, like Henry 
Allison, admit that his transcendental deduction of categories is one of the 
most disputed elements of his theory of knowledge.5 
In the section called “transcendental analytics” of his Critique of 
Pure Reason, Kant states that the goal of his research resides in decom-
posing the totality of our a6 priori knowledge into the elements of pure 
knowledge that are present in our understanding. Reading the works of 
David Hume had helped him awake from his long dogmatic dream: the 
belief that the traditional concepts of Metaphysics were capable of broade-
ning our knowledge of the empirical world. Hume’s critique made him 
realize that these notions are mere instruments of understanding, whose 
use does not lead us into any reliable result unless it is conjugated with 
the data drawn from experience. Purely speculative Metaphysics builds 
a prison of concepts; it cannot follow the path of rigorous and convincing 
science. The only valid and testable knowledge stems from the study of 
empirical reality, although Kant, still strongly attached to the ideal of a 
science blessed with the power to reach the levels of universality and cer-
titude that empirical reality cannot offer, thinks that the human mind 
possesses a set of innate categories. When rightly articulated with the 
information extracted from physical reality (Van Cleve argues that Kant’s 
transcendental deduction manifests the intrinsic necessity of applying the 
2. Cf. Förster, E. (ed.): Kant’s Transcendental Deductions. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1989.
3. Cf. Bossart, W.H.: “Kant’s Transcendental Deduction” in Kant-Studien 68, 1977, pp. 383-
403; Ameriks, K.: “Kant’s transcendental deduction as a regressive argument” in Kant-Stu-
dien 69, 1978, pp. 273-287.
4. Cf. Stepanenko, P.: Categorías y Autoconciencia en Kant. Antecedentes y Objetivos de la 
Deducción Trascendental de las Categorías. Mexico City: UNAM, 2000; Strawson, P.F.: The 
Bound of Sense. An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London: Methuen, 1973.
5. Cf. Allison, H.: Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense. New Hav-
en: Yale University Press, 2004, p. 134.
6. Cf. Kant, I.: Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, 201ss.
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categories to experience)7, these notions establish the foundation for the 
possibility of any science worthy of such a name, at least in Kant’s terms. 
We know that the Sun has risen today, but how can we be sure that 
the light of dawn will also appear tomorrow? Through induction, through 
the accumulation of experiences, we can only achieve moral certitude based 
upon custom. Induction is therefore incapable of dissipating the skeptical 
phantoms conjured by Hume. Kant is looking for absolute certainty, and in 
this passionate search of universal validity induction is ostensibly unable to 
satisfy his high aspirations. The quest for pure concepts inserted in the hu-
man mind, virginal ideas that remain unpolluted by the arbitrariness and 
mutability of the sensible world, is so narrowly connected with his ideals of 
universality and certitude that it is sometimes difficult to discover whether 
Kant bases his analysis upon the objective investigation on the nature of 
the human mind or whether he is moved by a profound (yet ungrounded) 
emotional adherence to these epistemological values. In any case, his trans-
cendental analytics will try to systematically elucidate these elementary 
concepts, capable of covering the totality of pure understanding. 
In his Metaphysics (book V, chapter 7), Aristotle had elaborated 
a list of categories or basic modes of attribution, but Kant considers his 
casting too vague and imprecise, the fruit of an exercise of trial and error 
rather than the result of a methodological inquiry. In his opinion, it must 
be possible to discover the set of basic categories inherent to any human 
understanding, the “software” with which our minds are endowed since 
the beginning and whose concepts integrate a unitary whole. These cate-
gories emerge as the operating rules into whose realm any possible object 
of the human experience is subsumed: they underlie all forms of judgment. 
As operators of understanding, categories generate judgments and they 
also imply a judgment about reality.
One of the presuppositions of Kant’s argument is the following: if 
it exists, this catalog of categories must be coherent and systematic, as 
pieces harmonized into a congruent mosaic. Let us agree on this audacious 
presupposition (increasingly dubious as we experience how volatile and 
incoherent the judgments of man can be, even the most elementary ones, 
even those reminiscent of the solidity of logic), for we shall show that the 
principal problem with Kant’s attempt lies in the rigidity of his system, 
regarded by him as a self-subsisting unity. In case of being feasible, this 
option would simply curtail the possibilities of real human progress: our 
mind could not escape from a set of inexorable categories bounded to its 
7. Cf. Van Cleve, J.: Problems from Kant. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999; for a discus-
sion, cf. Gomes, A.: “Is Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories fit for purpose?” in 
Kantian Review 15/2, 2010, pp. 118-137.
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understanding. No force could rescue us from this obscure prison of innate 
categories promulgated by nature through arcane decrees, and the eviden-
ce that the human being can conceive of spheres of reality and thought 
unimaginable for our ancestors would seem a Parmenidean illusion. 
Kant’s strategy to unveil the hard core of these a priori concepts 
that sustain universality and certitude in knowledge departs from stud-
ying the modes of judgment. A judgment is a “representation of a repre-
sentation of an object”8: a function that ordains different representations 
on the basis of a common representation. When I judge something, I link 
a subject to a predicate. However, how is it possible to ascertain that we 
have obtained all the representations from an exhaustive analysis of the 
modes of judgment? How can we know that all these hypothetical catego-
ries are actually elementary, instead of stemming from a combination of 
more basic forms of judgment? The distillation of Kant’s effort to identify 
the fundamental categories of the human mind leads us to twelve con-
cepts: three categories of quantity (unity, plurality, totality); three cate-
gories of quality (reality, negation, limitation); three categories of relation 
(inherence and subsistence, causality and dependence, community); three 
categories of modality (possibility-impossibility, existence-inexistence, ne-
cessity-contingency).
However, there is a clear asymmetry between categories. In fact, 
there is a hierarchy of categories which is not highlighted by Kant. Three 
of the fundamental categories cannot be reduced into any other one: being, 
possibility, non-being. The whole realm of thought falls into a basic duality 
(being and non-being) and the sphere of possibilities as the infinite set of 
intermediary degrees between being and non-being. The other categories, 
any other concept that we feel tempted to regard as an elementary notion, is 
hierarchically subordinated to the spectrum which, from being to non-being, 
comprehends the realm of the possible. This idea resonates in Parmenides’ 
identification of true knowledge with the concept of being, although he did 
not pay sufficient attention to the vast chain of intermediary degrees be-
tween being and non-being that are also susceptible to knowledge. 
Hence, the primary opposition between being and non-being cons-
titutes the fundamental category of the human mind. The other categories 
investigated by Kant emanate from this distinction through various com-
binations, as we shall show. His transcendental deduction is therefore es-
sentially mistaken, for it does not contemplate the hierarchy of categories 
in an appropriate way. 
If the human mind uses some basic rules of operation, there must be 
a cognitive advantage in elucidating them. However, the scope of this “re-
8. Kant, I.: Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, 205.
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search program” innately attached to the human mind can only be offered 
by the empirical world itself. The only plausible source from which this set 
of basic categories could have stemmed is the interaction of man (or any of 
our ancestors) with nature. Thus, it must empirical instead of pure -as Kant 
sought-. If we sometimes tend to consider it an immutable set of categories, 
it is because such a powerful bias towards rigidity obeys the limitations of 
our worldly experience: the deeper and greater my experience of the world 
is, the less rigid the fundamental concepts of my faculty of thinking will 
appear. In the dawn of our rationality, when our knowledge of the overwhel-
ming complexity of the world was still precarious, extremely rigid categories 
filtered our imagination of the real and the possible. As our experience of 
the world was expanded and improved, this scheme became broadened (nor-
mally in an unconscious, non-reflective way), and the elementary concepts 
of mind adopted larger degrees of ductility. But the selecting factor resides 
in the world. Through science, our theoretical imagination has been multi-
plied exponentially, so that today we are capable of contemplating notions 
that centuries ago would have challenged even the most luminous intellects. 
Of course, some irreducible categories persist, from whose influx not even 
the most courageous and visionary minds can detach themselves: being and 
non-being. But this fatality does not correspond to any restriction imposed 
by the human spirit. Rather, it evokes the ineluctable structure of the world: 
we cannot change the very being of the world; we are therefore compelled to 
use some basic categories from whose shadow we could only escape in the 
improbable –not to say impossible- case of a radical subversion of the world 
and its fundamental laws. 
The primary categories that can be derived from our experience of 
the world are subject to progressive refinements. Nothing prohibits their 
ramification into more sophisticated modes of judgment, in accordance 
with the realm of reality to which they are applied. However, their pillars 
are as solid and unassailable as the structure of the universe and the in-
violability of its fundamental laws. Essentially, we can summarize these 
laws (whose succinct expression can be found in the laws of Thermodyna-
mics) into two great groups:
a) The first is about the identity of the objects in the world. 
Experience, even in its most rudimentary manifestations, 
informs us that in reality many bodies remain identical to 
themselves. The conscience of identity of one object with itself 
was founded upon the evidence offered by our interaction with 
the world. No matter how distressing and inexplicable some 
changes could be, the overall aggregate of our experiences 
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pointed to one fact: a significant part of the world conserves its 
structure and powers. The metaphysical notion of “substance” 
reminds us of an important intuition: within the totality of 
worldly phenomena, an important fraction of its elements 
preserves its identity and resists any attempt of relevant 
modification. The thermodynamic correlate of the idea of 
identity (the permanence of an object in its own ontological 
realm) can be found in the law of conservation of energy.9 
In thermodynamics, it is useful to express this principle as 
implying that the change in the internal energy of the system 
U must be equal to the heat added to the system minus the 
work done by the system (∆U = Q − W). However, this result 
points to a more general and profound law of nature, namely 
the symmetry between energy and time as two canonically 
conjugated variables whose product yields units of action: the 
total energy of an isolated system remains constant. 
b) In the laws of Thermodynamics we find a magisterial synthesis 
of the great theoretical and technological developments of 19th 
century energy physics. Nevertheless, this science is incapable 
of explaining a vast array of material phenomena if its 
reasoning is based solely on the law of conservation of energy. 
Soon, it became patent that an additional law was needed to 
understand how thermodynamic systems work. This second 
law included a mysterious quantity, baptized as “entropy” 
by Rudolf Clausius. Its variation between states A and B is 
defined in terms of the quantity of heat and the temperature 
of a system.10 Theoretical progress in Thermodynamics and 
9. A technical definition of the first principle of Thermodynamics can be put as follows: “The 
work needed to change an adiabatic system from one specified state to another specified 
state is the same however the work is done” (Atkins, P.W.: Physical Chemistry. Oxford, Ox-
ford University Press, 1994, p. 61). The second law could be expressed in this way: <<The 
entropy of an isolated system increases in the course of spontaneous change>>. The third law 
of Thermodynamics states that it is impossible to reach absolute zero in a finite number of 
steps. Sometimes a “zero principle” of Thermodynamics is added, according to which <<if two 
systems are in thermal equilibrium with a third one, they are all in thermal equilibrium>>. 
See Atkins, P.W.: Four Laws That Drive the Universe. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007.
10. Although thermodynamic entropy (either in the classical sense given to it by Clausius 
-based on the macroscopic properties on the system-, the statistical and micro-level descrip-
tion unveiled by Boltzmann or the quantum treatment proposed by Von Neumann) is not 
strictly equivalent to Shannon’s information entropy, both concepts can be connected through 
the axiomatic approach to thermodynamics suggested by Lieb and Yngvason, as shown by 
Weilenmann, M. – Kraemer, L. – Faist, P. – Renner, R.: “Axiomatic relation between ther-
modynamic and information-theoretic entropies” in Physical Review Letters 117/26, 2016.
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statistical physics contributed to the interpretation of entropy 
as a measure of the degree of disorder inside a system. The 
work of Ludwig Boltzmann11 played a central role in the 
consolidation of this idea. In fact, the inexorable increase 
of this magnitude inspired a deep and illuminating analogy 
with the concept of time. Sir Arthur Eddington12 referred 
to the second law in terms of the “arrow of time,” inasmuch 
as it imposes asymmetry, irreversibility between an event 
and its consequences: if entropy necessarily increases in any 
spontaneous change, the universe travels in an inexorable 
direction and time is real; the future symbolizes the point 
towards which the law of entropy irrevocably leads any present 
physical system. If disorder could spontaneously decrease, 
a system could return to its past form without encountering 
the inflexible limits that drive it into the nebulous future. But 
the idea of time, the notion of change between antecedents 
and consequences, also suggests the concept of difference. If 
the first law pointed to the category of identity, understood 
as permanence of an object within its own realm (at least as 
permanence of significant parts of its structure), the second 
principle of Thermodynamics is intimately linked to the idea of 
difference: the limit between one state and another, capable of 
breaking the apparent and rigid unity expressed by the notion 
of “permanence.” If that which is identical to itself changes, 
it therefore establishes a difference with respect to itself, 
adopting new manifestations: “it negates itself.” The idea of 
difference cannot be separated from the concept of negation. In 
its basic logical form, it points to “non-being” (just as the idea 
of identity refers to “being”). 
The explanatory power of these fundamental laws of nature covers 
the majority of our relevant experiences. If our model is correct, they un-
derlie the two primary categories used by our mind in its exploration of 
the world: being (identity, permanence, affirmation) and non-being (diffe-
rence, change, negation). Of course, a huge and potentially infinite specter 
11. If a system is in thermodynamic equilibrium, the probability of occupying a state i with 
energy E is proportional to a function of the kind e^((-E)/kT)/Z, where k is Boltzmann’s con-
stant, T stands for the temperature of the system and Z represents the partition function.  
12. Cf. Eddington, A.: The Nature of the Physical World. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1928. 
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of relations is associated with this duality: the realm of the possible. Hence, 
it does not consist of a unity as rigid as Parmenides had imagined in his 
famous poem, because the ideas of “being” and “non-being,” of identity and 
difference, admit countless conjugations, leading into a much larger elen-
chus of potential judgments. However, the basic categories are comprised in 
three fundamental ideas: being, non-being, possibility (regarded as the set 
of variable degrees of relation between being and non-being). The remaining 
categories proposed by Kant emerge as ramifications of these three initial 
concepts and cannot be placed on the same epistemological level. 
From being, possibility, and non-being and through the right com-
binations, we can unveil the other Kantian categories. The categories in-
cluded by Kant in the realm of “quantity” are entirely reducible to our 
three primary categories. The notions of unity, plurality, and totality refer 
to the degrees of relation that can exist between being, possibility, and 
non-being: being considered in itself (or non-being) is necessarily unitary; 
if we contemplate the degrees of possibility between being and non-being, 
we open the window for ontological plurality; if we assume all the poten-
tial degrees between being and non-being, we suggest totality. Concerning 
the categories of quality, there is an immediate connection with being, 
possibility, and non-being (the real, its negation, and the gradual limita-
tions or differences that can be recognized between both of them; limit is 
the obvious expression of difference). The categories of modality coincide 
with our three fundamental notions (impossibility is the conjunction of 
“non-being” and “possibility;” necessity is a property of the identity of be-
ing with itself and the non-identity of non-being with itself; contingency 
is profoundly linked to the variable degrees of possibility that can divi-
de being and non-being). Regarding the categories of relation examined 
by Kant, the ideas of inherence, causality, and community arise from the 
conjugation of identity and difference: because time exists and reality is 
subject to change, its elements establish interactions and lose the impas-
sibility that would define a static and closed universe (eternal, non-tempo-
ral, and incorruptible). 
The thesis that our internal capacity of perception is fine-tuned 
through its interaction with the external world provides a very useful tool to 
escape from the objection of circularity that can be posed against any theory 
of innate ideas (or its analogous expression as a priori categories). It was Ar-
nauld who, while discussing the principal tenets of Descartes’ Meditations, 
realized that the acceptance of innate ideas succumbed to the objection of 
circularity:13 if we admit that the human mind is endowed with a set of ideas 
13. Cf. Manrique, J. F.: “La lengua universal de Leibniz” en Saga-Revista de Estudiantes de 
Filosofía 8/16, 2007, p. 116.
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that have not been induced from the world, we must identify the cause of 
their presence in our intellect; only a being in possession of the attributes 
of perfection and goodness –God- can assure that these innate ideas will 
not deceive us in our interaction with the external world; however, and in 
order to prove the existence of God, those who support innatism must de-
part from the innate idea of God and follow the ontological argument, but at 
this point we reach a petitio principii, because we cannot know whether it 
is God who has placed the idea of himself in our mind before having proved 
his existence. Nevertheless, if the internal disposition of our understanding 
(Leibniz’s ipse intellectus) simply grants us a virtually empty set able to for-
malize any input (a structure rather than a specific content), even the inna-
te dimensions of this perceptive apparatus will be susceptible to a gradual 
fine-tuning elicited by the demands of the external world. Hence, it will be 
possible to obtain an increasing degree of certitude in our conviction that, in 
spite of filtering our perception of the world through innate structures, their 
flexibility always overcomes their rigidity.14 Here we can contemplate the 
explanatory advantage of any mechanism based upon the duality between 
variation and selection, whose reciprocity avoids circularity, as it does not 
consecrate any of the two poles but defines each of them in its mutuality and 
complementarity with the other. 
Kant is opposed to inducing the fundamental categories of the mind 
from experience. Given that he does not want to run the risk of depriving 
them from universality and necessity -features that the material world 
can never bestow-, he prefers to satisfy the demanding petitions of a ratio-
nalistic intellect. However, we can find a series of arguments that prevent 
us from this stubborn reluctance to sustain the fundamental categories of 
understanding upon the structure of the world. 
First of all, Kant himself would have to admit that not all catego-
ries are invested with universality and necessity, for what shall we say 
about the category of “contingency”? Is it necessary? Of course, our author 
puts this category inextricably paired to the idea of necessity, but the very 
concept of contingency excludes the features of necessity and universali-
ty. Regarding plurality, shall we say that it is necessary for plurality to 
exist in the world? How do we know that the world could not subsist as 
a monotonous and immutable unity, with no cleavages between causes 
and effects, with no division between substances and accidents, with no 
disharmony between agents and patients? Kant concedes that the human 
mind empirically associates objects by virtue of affinities. Following him, 
the categories that nurture the operations of our mind could entail the 
14. I have dealt with this problem in “Truth in an Evolutionary Perspective” in Scientia et 
Fides 2/1, 2014, pp. 203-220.
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recognition of patterns inferred from the structure of nature, organized 
in more or less compact domains whose disposition suggests increasing or 
decreasing degrees of affinity. 
Necessity is a category intimately connected with the idea of perma-
nence, of identity (the logical form of an analytic propositions is: “A is A;” 
this proposition is necessarily true and it can never succumb to contingen-
cy), but it does not exhaust the sphere of intelligibility offered by the remai-
ning categories. If we accept the logical legitimacy of change and difference, 
we must admit the autonomy of the contingent realm, of that which instead 
of being closed over its own identity assumes new structures, often unfore-
seeable. Therefore, and in order to become intelligible, not every judgment 
needs to be reduced into the categories of necessity and universality. 
The demand of necessity, upon which Kant constantly insists in his 
Critique of Pure Reason, can stem from two sources: psychological impera-
tives or knowledge of the fine structure of reality. In the first case, my lon-
ging for necessity and my will to find it beyond any evidence is subjective 
and arbitrary; it is due to causes that are alien to the purity of logical rea-
soning which Kant has fervently exalted. I want to contemplate necessary 
connections, radiations of the immutable, because I may feel tormented 
by the evanescence of my own life, my own happiness, my own hopes and 
desires. As I fear death and the abrupt ending of all the venturous expe-
riences that I have lived, it is outside me where I look for that permanence 
that I cannot find in my own being. Distressed by the inconstancy and 
volubility of many of my thoughts, wills, and efforts, overwhelmed by the 
deep insecurity that the threatening mysteries of life produce in my spirit, 
I shed all my anguish into the world and I try to detect in nature signs of 
the irrevocable permanence which is absent in my mind. 
In the second case, the search of necessity is not rooted in the 
abysses of human psychology but in the understanding of the world. Here 
we can therefore say that our longing for necessity is utterly justified: it 
emanates from the discovery of patterns of behavior that describe the most 
relevant features of the universe. If I know the structure of the world and 
I am capable of understanding how its parts are imbricated and how some 
elements are repercussive upon others, then I can predict rules of behav-
ior closely adjusted to reality. It is true that nothing can guarantee, in 
apodictic terms, that an object released from my hand will always fall on 
the floor, because there is a disturbing but unlikely chance: at some point, 
this body may behave in a different, unforeseen way. But if I penetrate the 
structure of the universe and I unveil its physical laws, I will realize that 
there is a profound reason why the body falls on the surface of the Earth. 
Newton called it “gravity,” although he could not solve the problem of actio 
in distans: how a body, as massive as it can be, can attract another body if 
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they are spatially separated. It was Einstein who, through a profound and 
fascinating study of the structure of space-time, understood that gravity 
is the effect of the curvature that massive objects exert upon space. And 
in a set of equations, admirable for their beauty and synthetic power, he 
summarized this intuition in terms of the relationship between the cur-
vature tensor and the stress-energy tensor. With knowledge, uncertainty 
before the future disappears: if I know the fine structure of the universe, 
my predictive power asymptotically approaches the limit of perfection that 
would bless a divine intellect. 
There is, of course, a quantum uncertainty that forbids the com-
plete determination of the destiny of the universe. But the world could 
be locally non-deterministic and globally deterministic. Also, we have dis-
covered this limit to our predictive knowledge after a deep and rigorous 
research into the structure of the world. This inquiry has permitted us to 
elucidate a fundamental uncertainty and express it into a set of equations 
which in some way “circumscribe” it (or, as paradoxical as it may sound, 
they determine this uncertainty). And contrary to the constraints imposed 
by Heisenberg’s principle, the chaotic behavior shown by some systems 
that are extremely sensitive to small alterations in their initial conditions 
does not involve a fundamental uncertainty; therefore, it does not close (at 
least in such a clamorous and sometimes saddening manner) the gates of 
our understanding of nature.
Our knowledge of the world still lies in darkness. In every branch 
of science new questions emerge, and it is possible that the power of our in-
tellect will never solve all mysteries. However, as we gain a more compre-
hensive understanding of the universe and its astonishing sophistications, 
shall we not feel legitimate to say that we have elucidated the patterns 
of behavior prevailing in the world, so that uncertainty before the future 
does not distress us any longer? Untamed questions will always exist and 
will constantly increase our thirst of wisdom, the horizon of our curiosity, 
because the world is potentially infinite, and a finite intelligence can never 
extinguish the unceasingly new light that the universe offers under the 
form of unknown intellectual challenges. 
The “transcendental” realm, the hypothetical sphere that contains 
the conditions of possibility of understanding, simply reflects the degree of 
development of our conscience of the world and our own beings. It can be 
perfected through the feedback given by the world itself; it has happened 
in the past and it can occur in the future. Kant’s rigid scheme of catego-
ries confines understanding to a timeless prison, obstructing any fruit-
ful dialogue with evolutionary biology. It raises a wall, colossal but futile, 
between epistemology and biology, condemning philosophical inquiry to 
a sterile conflict with the natural sciences. Of course, we can excuse the 
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egregious philosopher from Königsberg for having supported this understanding 
of the human mind, because a fundamental truth about the human species 
and nature (evolution) was still unknown. But nowadays we are capable 
of deciphering the intimate language of the biological kingdom, and the 
discoveries about our evolution from non-human ancestors whose intellec-
tual faculties were inferior to ours grant us invaluable light on our origin. 
Overwhelming evidence suggests that mind has evolved from less 
complex stages into the levels crowned at the present time. Nothing can 
be gained from opposing this fact. To take refuge in the lacunae that still 
cover some aspects of the theory of evolution will only delay the advent of 
the inevitable: an evolutionary understanding of the genesis of our most 
remarkable mental abilities. It is unfeasible to think that the set of el-
ementary categories used by the human brain15 in its exploration of the 
world has been born once and forever, in an unknown moment of the past 
and through enigmatic causes, because science draws a very different and 
plausible picture (the gradual development of more sophisticated cate-
gories out of more elementary notions; evolution may still be working). 
Hence, any philosophy that is melancholically attached to epistemological 
dualism and eager to build a celestial temple for human intelligence, a 
sacred citadel that protects it against any kind of empirical serfdom, is 
condemned to capitulate sooner or later. 
Logic, in short, is the mental replication of the world. Perhaps not 
so metaphorically, it may be said that logic is the assimilated world; it is 
mental thermodynamics, because it sticks to the operational rules that 
govern the universe, whose foundations appeal to the basic principles of 
thermodynamics (the transformations of energy). Nature provides the 
norm for the basic categories of our logic. The universe constitutes its own 
law, but the human mind needs to split both spheres and distinguish be-
tween the elements and the operative rules that deal with them.
15. Although still a broad speculation, it is not implausible to think that the human brain is 
endowed with some neurobiological structures in charge of recognizing the fundamental logical 
patterns that we have outlined in the previous paragraphs (in essence, identity, difference, 
and possibility). Neuroscientists have gathered evidence of the existence of “place cells” that 
activated in tasks relating to spatial orientation (see O’Keefe, J.: “A review of the hippocampal 
space cells” in Progress in Neurobiology 13/4, 1979, pp. 419-439). Would it be too bold to suggest 
the presence of “logical cells”, activated when we use these primary logical categories? 
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